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Abstract
The experience of the Kashmir insurgency is used, to assess the im-
pact of this armed conflict on educational outcomes of girls and boys who
were of school age during the 90’s. Girls and boys who went to primary
and secondary schools in urban areas of Kashmir during 1990 and 1996
are affected the most by the insurgency. I compare their outcomes to
women and men who finished their schooling before 1990 and girls and
boys living in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Girls in ur-
ban Kashmir have up to 3.5 years less schooling compared to girls less
affected by the violence. Boys and girls more affected by violence are
less likely to complete their primary schooling, as well as enroll less in
primary schooling, compared to boys and girls less-affected by the insur-
gency. Secondary education is not affected negatively by the insurgency.
The results remain qualitatively robust once accounting for migration, dif-
ferent age cohorts, a different identification of Kashmiri and continuous
measurements of violence. The first phase of the insurgency has a nega-
tive impact on education, especially for girls in primary schools. Literacy
and employment programs should be designed to target these women.
JEL-Classification: D12, F51, I25, 012,
Keywords: Armed Conflicts, Education, Households
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1 Introduction
An armed conflict is a negative external shock to the livelihood of households. It
disrupts their daily routines, creates constant fear of violence and death, as well
destroys local infrastructures. Households are forced to dislocate if the violence
becomes too intense. Armed conflicts can range from a war, to a civil war and
insurgencies. These forms differ in conflict intensity, exposure to violence and
length.
The economic well-being of households and individuals is reduced during
and after an armed conflict.1 The consensus in the literature is that for groups
more vulnerable to violence, armed conflicts reduce their educational outcomes.
Educational outcomes include years of schooling (Akresh and de Walque 2008,
Akbulut-Yuksel 2009, Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers 2010, Shemyakina
2011), school enrollment (Shemyakina 2011) and school completion (Swee 2009).
The strongest impacts are on girls in primary education.
My study focuses on the Kashmir insurgency. I assess the long run im-
pacts of the insurgency on educational outcomes for women and men who were
school-aged during the first phase of the insurgency from 1990 to 1996. Al-
though different studies were done on various educational outcomes, conflicts
are different in their historical background and the actual conflict experience.
I compare educational outcomes for women and men more affected by the
insurgency with individuals who finished their schooling before the outbreak, as
well who live in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir. The insurgency is
a natural experiment which allows me to employ a difference in difference tech-
nique to estimate the magnitude of the average treatment effect of the conflict.
The educational system shows improvements for the state of Jammu and
Kashmir during the Nineties. New schools were opened and more teachers were
hired which results in increased enrollment rates, especially for girls but also less
dropout rates for girls and boys (J&K Directorate of Statistics 2011). But not
everyone benefitted from the development. Boys and girls living in urban areas
of Kashmir, especially cities, were affected the most by violence in the forms of
shootings, bomb explosions, harassment, or in the case of young women: rape.
These girls and boys lost education because of the insurgency and will never be
able to catch up as adults.
1If I ignore the case of war profiteers (Justino 2009).
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I find for girls living in cities of Kashmir have up to 3.5 years less schooling
compared to the control groups who are less affected by the insurgency. Girls
and boys in primary education are less likely to finish their schooling. The de-
mand for primary education is less for girls and boys living in urban areas of
Kashmir. The insurgency has no negative impact on secondary education. Boys
and girls in secondary education are older and less vulnerable than children in
primary education. The results remain robust after accounting for migration,
different age cohorts, a different identification strategy for Kashmiri and differ-
ent conflict exposure measures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the households in
armed conflict literature. Section 3 describes the Kashmir insurgency. Section 4
is the main part of my paper. I explain my identification strategy and introduce
the data. The remaining part discusses the impact of the insurgency on years
of schooling. In section 5 I perform different robustness checks and the paper
concludes in section 6.
2 Literature Review
Since the mid 2000’s the literature has been growing and covers educational out-
comes, health, displacement and labor force participation. The reason is that
datasets for conflict affected regions have become finally available2. Although
the data sets are not specifically designed to assess the conflict experience it-
self, it is possible to use difference in difference analyses for short and long-run
impacts on economic outcomes. Those outcomes are typical negative for groups
more affected by the armed conflict.
Schooling outcomes are less for women and men in Germany, who lived in
high-intensity bombing areas during WW II (Akbulut-Yuksel 2009). Boys in
Rwanda, who experienced and survived the 1994 genocide, have up to 1.5 years
less schooling (Akresh and de Walque 2008). Given that average schooling
in Rwanda is four years only, the genocide had a large impact on education.
Shemyakina (2011) finds that for the civil war in Tajikistan, girls in the South
have less schooling compared to girls in the North of Tajiskistan. Women in
Nepal have less education compared to women who finished schooling before the
2Those data sets include for instance the Living Standard Measurement Surveys from the
World Bank or country data sets provided by Measure DHS.
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insurgency broke out (Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers 2010).
Conflict can affect children’s development through stress caused to the mother
during pregnancy, as well during the first months of life. Access to health fa-
cilities and nutrition for newborns can become scarce. Height, as the health
outcome predicting future productivity, can be affected negatively. Individuals
who grew up in areas more affected by bombings during WW II in Germany
are smaller and earn less in their later life (Akbulut-Yuksel 2009). Galdo (2010)
finds that, in the case of Peru, different types of violence affect children height
negatively.
Through conflict people leave their homes to live in safer areas. Deininger,
Ana and Pablo (2004) focus on the willingness to return of displaced households
in Colombia. Households return if they left strong social networks behind and
if employment opportunities are given at the origin site. Bozzoli, Bru¨ck and
Muhumuza (2011) look into activity choices of displaced persons and returnees
in camps in Northern Uganda and find that displaced persons engaged in self
employment.
Shemyakina (2011) and Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers (2010) find an
added worker effect for women. A conflict changes local labor markets from two
sides. Less male workers are available which affects the supply side but also
increases demand for female workers to fill positions. Furthermore due to the
loss of male breadwinners in households women labor supply increases.
Research, besides various NGO reports, on the effects of the Kashmir in-
surgency on individuals is limited. Doctors without borders (Jong et Al 2008)
interview women and men around Srinagar City to assess their physical and
psychological health after experiencing different forms of violence during the
insurgency. Depression and fear leaving the home is a common finding. Pe-
tersen and Vedel (1994) assess forms of torture on patients in Srinagar hospital
committed by security forces earlier. Dabla (2010) finds in several studies, in
using small samples of widowed women and orphaned children, that women
work more and the living situations of those families is mostly poorly. Ku-
mar (2009) describes the situation of displaced non-Kashmiri in camps around
Jammu and Kashmir. Those camps lack in education opportunities for children,
health services and employment opportunities for adults.
Educational outcomes for Kashmiri are assumed to be negative (Joshi 1999,
Schofield 2001, Kashmircorps 2008), but so far no quantitative support for this
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statement exists to the best of my knowledge.
3 The Kashmir insurgency
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is one of the 28 states in India. It has a distinct
history and consists of three parts: Jammu, Kashmir also known as the valley
and Ladakh. Those three parts are different from each other by composition of
the population, historical background and the language. Ladakh is barely pop-
ulated. The regions are further divided into 22 districts and smaller units called
”tehsils”3. The overall population of 12.5 Million splits up between Jammu 43
percent and Kashmir 55 percent (Census of India 2011). Kashmir has a Muslim
majority of 97 percent. Jammu has around 40 percent Hindus and 60 percent
Muslims. The Muslims in the valley are different from Muslims in Jammu in
the practice of the Islam. They also speak Kashmiri which is almost exclusive
to the valley.
J&K ranks in most economic categories very low (Census of India 2001).
Literacy and employment rates are low, especially for women. There is a dif-
ferential between urban and rural areas, which is typical for India but between
Jammu and Kashmir as well.
The state of J&K has been the reason for three short wars between India
and Pakistan (1947, 1965 and 1999) over the territory. India and Pakistan claim
the region for themselves. This is known as the Kashmir conflict or sometimes
as a ”proxy war” between India and Pakistan with skirmishes around the Line
of Control (LoC). The LoC is separating the Indian and Pakistani part of the
Kashmir region.
Today the insurgency itself is embedded in the dispute between those two
powers, but started as a movement for independence of Kashmiri Muslims called
”Azaadi” or freedom. J&K experienced economic improvements during the late
Seventies and Eighties but many in the valley felt left out (Habibullah 2008).
The local government remained chronically corrupt, most public jobs went to
Hindus, and the Kashmiri did not feel represented in the state assembly and
parliament (Habibullah 2008).
The Muslims founded their own party the ”Muslim United Front” (MUF)
in 1986 and a militant arm the ”Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front” (JKLF).
3Before 2011 those were 14 districts which I will base my analysis on.
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The JKLF attracted educated but unemployed young male Muslims from the
valley (Kadian 1993). Militancy started to show up during the Eighties e.g.
kidnapping of politicians but became more frequent in the late Eighties after a
disappointing outcome for the MUF in the 1987 state assembly election. Due to
rigging at some ballots, the JKLF committed more violent incidences following
the election (Wolpert 2010).
The official start of the insurgency is after the December 1989 kidnapping
of Rubaiya Sayeed the daughter of the newly appointed Indian home minister
for Kashmir affairs. After her release, the Indian central government sent in
security forces to J&K to break down any form of rebellion. Security forces
came into Srinagar City and executed brutal crackdowns where mostly civilians
suffered (Schofield 2001). By 1992 30.000 security forces were deployed across
the valley in major cities alone (Joshi 1999, p.130). Those security forces were
unfamiliar with the language and not trained in fighting militancy (Joshi 1999).
Human right violations committed by both sides, but especially violations
committed by Indian forces against civilians were normality. Asia Watch (1993)
describes is as the ”human rights crisis” besides the actual insurgency. By the
mid Nineties violations committed by Indian forces became less but also the
insurgency itself changed.
The insurgency could be split up into three phases (Meyerle 2008, SATP
2011). The first phase was from 1990 to 1996 were militancy focused on urban
areas. From the late Nineties to 2001/02 militancy moved to rural areas and
districts of Jammu. The third phase is from 2002 to today. This phase is a low
intensity insurgency.
During the first phase most violent events took place in urban areas of Kash-
mir especially the capital Srinagar city and other smaller cities. The insurgency
was a movement for independence. Up to 100.000 Hindus left the valley in
the first two years because of the militancy and settled down in camps around
Jammu and New Dehli (Asia Watch 1993). By the mid Nineties Indian se-
curity forces controlled the cities and militancy died out slowly. ”Normalcy”
(Joshi 1999, p.92) came back to urban areas in Kashmir and elections could be
held again in 1996. Militancy moved to more rural areas beginning in the mid
Nineties, but also became more violent in targeting not just security forces.
The groups behind the insurgency changed. After the JKFL had lost outside
5
support4, pro Pakistan groups like the Hizbul-Muhajideen became the driving
force behind the insurgency. The JKFL officially retreated in 1994 (Joshi 1999).
The second phase is from the mid Nineties to the early 2000’s. Foreign
groups with own agendas like the Lashkar-e-Taiba entered the militancy and
it became a ”jihad” against India (Meyerle 2008). Militancy moved to rural
areas of the valley, but also to the Doda, Rajouri and Poonch district of Jammu
in the late Nineties. Hindus were targeted and got massacred, as well suicide
attacks against security forces became a common strategy early in 2000. The
violence peaked in 2001/02 and went down after more security operations were
conducted at the LoC to stop infiltration (SATP 2011).
The third phase is a low-level insurgency without any major incidences.
Civilians in Jammu and Kashmir have learned to cope with the presence of
security forces and sporadic incidences.
Figure 1 shows the districts of Jammu and Kashmir. The districts most
affected by the insurgency during the early 1990’s were Srinagar, especially
Srinagar city, Baramula, Kupwara, Anantnag, Pulwama and Badgam. I ranked
the districts according to own calculations and evidence found in the literature.
Figure 2 shows overall numbers of victims of the insurgency from 1990 to
2011. As a lower bound the insurgency cost the lives of 14634 civilians, 6007
security forces and 22535 militants, as well the destruction of local infrastruc-
ture in the last two decades (SATP 2011). The first phase started 1990 with a
large increase in victims and peaked in 1996. After 1996 the number of civilian
victims is below the pre 1996 levels. The insurgency changed and cost more
lives of militants and security forces.
[figure 1: map about here]
[figure 2: violent incidences based on SATP]
4I will not discuss the role of Pakistan’s involvement in the Kashmir insurgency here.
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4 Educational outcomes
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
I utilize the National Family Health Survey for India (NFHS). It is a repre-
sentative survey conducted at the state level focusing on health of women and
children but also offering demographic background questions. There are three
individual rounds NHFS-I (1993), NFHS-II (1998) and NFHS-III (2005). Ever-
married women in the age of 15 to 49 were interviewed. I will use the NHFS-III
only for two reasons. First it offers enough individuals who were school-aged
during the first phase of the insurgency and second it has a male questionnaire
for the first time. For the state of Jammu and Kashmir I have information on
3281 women and 1076 men.
Table 1 summarize basic descriptive statistics. There are differences in years
of schooling between women and men, as well urban and rural areas. Almost
half of the women (40 percent) have no education at all. There is already a
long-run trend visible for most Indian states. Individuals who finished primary
schooling before 1990 have less schooling compared to women and men who
finished schooling afterwards. India has the goal to literate all people. After
realizing that still too many women and men are illiterate, actions got intensified
during the late Eighties (Fifth All India Education Survey 1985).
The sample is representative in respect to composition of religion and lan-
guage spoken. Household size is national average. The low labor force partici-
pation for women compared to men is national average as well (Census of India
2001).
[table 1 about here]
4.2 Identification and empirical strategy
To employ a difference in difference analysis I need women and men more af-
fected by the insurgency than others to be able to compare their educational
outcomes. The actual treatment is the insurgency. The treatment group was
of school age during the first phase of the insurgency from 1990 to 1996 while
the control group finished schooling before 1990. In India compulsory primary
schooling is for the age group 6 to 14. Primary schooling covers classes I to V
and VI to VII. From age 15 onwards children can enroll into secondary schools.
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By the age of 15 children should have completed primary education. The treat-
ment group will be the age cohort 15 to 29 in 2005. Everyone older than 29 will
be in the control group.
Not every child in school age is equally affected by the insurgency which has
a spatial dimension. During the Nineties most violent events took place in urban
areas of Kashmir, especially in cities. I constructed a dataset of violent events
at the district level using various sources including books, reports, newspaper
articles and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) to complete the picture
drawn in the literature (Joshi 1999, Schofield 2001 and Meyerle 2008).
I include women and men in the control group who were school-aged during
the insurgency, but who were less or not affected by the violence. This will be
the case for children of school age in Jammu and in rural areas of Kashmir.
My goal is to employ a triple difference in difference analysis in analyzing
primary school outcomes. I perform analyses for secondary school education as
well, but assume children in primary school age is the group most vulnerable to
violence.
One drawback in the NFHS-III is that I cannot identify the exact location
(district or valley) of the household. I will use language spoken as the identifier.
Jammu and Kashmir has distinct languages spoken in some parts but not others.
Kashmiri is almost exclusively spoken in the valley. Furthermore I know if a
household lives in a capital, city or town.
In the sample 55 percent speak Kashmir while 45 percent speak the re-
maining languages. This reflects the composition of the J&K’s population with
around 55 percent in Kashmir and 45 percent in Jammu.
The empirical model is the following:
Yijt = α+ γ(war * cohort) + β
n∑
i=1
Xi + δj + ωt + τ + ijt (1)
where Yijt is the educational outcome (years of schooling, school completion
or enrollment) for individual i, living in j, and belonging to age cohort t. Xi
includes demographic controls while δj reflects regional fixed effects, ωt age
cohort fixed effects and τ time fixed effects. ijt is the usual error-term. I
use robust standard errors in the models. γ is the average treatment effect of
someone who is in the age cohort 15 to 29 (cohort) and lives in a conflict affected
region (war). I use war for urban areas and war2 for cities in Kashmir.
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4.3 Years of schooling
Armed conflicts can lower the returns of investment on education. The under-
lying supply and demand for eduction changes (Shemyakina 2011, Chamarbag-
wala and Moran 2011). The supply of quality education is reduced, for instance
school buildings get destroyed or occupied by armed forces or militants. Another
reason is that teachers migrate. The demand for education is reduced, because
of the increased risk of going to school. Especially girls go less to school. Girls
are more likely to experience violence than boys (Shemyakina 2011). Further-
more children have to stay home to offset incomes losses caused by the dead
of the breadwinner. In some cases young males are forced to participate in the
conflict through a draft e.g. in Bosnia (Bhaumik, Gang and Yun 2005) or as
child soldiers in the case of Burundi (Blattman and Annan 2010)
Table 2 shows differences in average years of schooling between Kashmiri and
non-Kashmiri, as well urban and rural areas. I also present difference between
city sizes. The table is split up between women and men. Women and men who
went to school after the insurgency broke out, have on average more years of
schooling than women and men who finished their education before 1990. Only
women in cities in Kashmir have less schooling. The overall trend in education
is a positive one. In comparing mean values the insurgency did not affect years
of schooling negatively for most groups. The reason is that normalcy came back
to the valley after 1992 (Joshi 1999). Despite the outbreak of the insurgency the
goal of the local government was to keep daily routines running. The amount of
security forces in the major cities of the valley made going to school relatively
”safe”. During the early Nineties enrollment rates, number of teachers and the
number of school buildings went up for the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K
Development Report 20085). Dabla (2010) mentions that private schools opened
in Srinagar city which could offset the negative effect of public schools occupied
by forces.
[table 2 about here]
Comparing mean values creates an omitted variable bias. The effect of the insur-
gency can be under- or overstated. I use difference-in-difference OLS regressions
to account for variation caused by other variables.
5Note, that the numbers are reported for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir. The are
no statistics available for the Kashmir part only.
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Table 3 and 4 summarize the results for girls in primary school age. I use
the older cohort living in different areas of J&K as the control group in the
first part of table 3 and 4. In the second part of table 3 and 4 I use girls from
the same age cohort as the control group but living in less affected regions of
Jammu and Kashmir.
The results for girls living in urban areas of Kashmir are presented in table 3.
I choose women, who finished their schooling before 1990 as the control group.
They live in Jammu and Kashmir, urban and rural areas of Kashmir or urban
areas of Kashmir. The average treatment effect of the insurgency is negative
but not significant for girls in urban areas of Kashmir in my models. Given that
the underlying development in Jammu and Kashmir is more years of schooling
during the Nineties, these girls are left out from this development. They do not
have more years of schooling.
The control variables include religion, being a Kashmiri or not and city
size. Muslims have less education compared to Hindus. Kashmiri women have
more education than women living in Jammu. Women living in urban areas
(capital, cities, towns) have more education than women living in rural areas.
The interpretations hold when I change the control group to the same age cohort
but living in less conflict affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir.
The second part of table 3 summarizes the results for the same age cohorts.
I compare girls living in urban areas of Kashmir with the remaining regions in
Jammu and Kashmir, urban areas of Jammu and rural Kashmir. Girls in urban
Kashmir have more years of schooling than girls in rural Kashmir because of the
urban-rural differential present in J&K. The treatment effect is not significantly
different from zero when I use J&K and urban Jammu as the less conflict affected
regions. Girls in urban Kashmir do not have more years of schooling because of
the insurgency.
In table 4 I change the treatment group to girls living in cities of Kashmir.
A city has a population of more than 100.000. Most of the violence during the
Nineties occurred in cities of Kashmir. The results are similar as before. Girls
of primary school age do not have more years of schooling compared to the
older cohort. I obtain similar results when I compare school-going girls living in
cities of Kashmir with school-going girls in less affected regions of Jammu and
Kashmir.
The results for the male sample are summarized in table 5 and 6. My
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strategy is the same as for women. Table 5 shows the results for school-aged
boys living in urban areas of Kashmir during the insurgency. The male sample is
significantly smaller than the female sample. I interpret the results with caution
because the average treatment effects are unreasonably high in magnitude. Boys
are not affected by the insurgency in their years of schooling compared to the
older cohort. If I change the control groups to the same age cohort, but living
in less affected parts of J&K, I obtain similar results.
The results remain robust to a change in the treatment group to boys living
in cities of Kashmir (table 6). I refer to a detailed discussion below. The
strategy changes to a difference in difference in difference approach to obtain
more reasonable results for the male sample, as well to test the robustness of
the results for the female sample.
In using a simple difference in difference approach I limit my choice of control
groups to compare with. Furthermore the average treatment effects for the male
sample are unreasonably high. I expand the control groups by accounting for
the timing and geographical variation of the insurgency in using a difference in
difference in difference technique. The control groups finished schooling before
1990, but also live in less affected regions during the early Nineties. Without
the insurgency school-aged girls and boys living in cities and urban areas of
Kashmir should have more education.
Table 7 and 8 summarize the results for women and men respectively. Table
7 and 8 has two parts. The left side shows the result for school-aged individuals
living in urban areas of Kashmir (war). The right side of table 7 and 8 shows
results for school-aged individuals living in cities of Kashmir during the insur-
gency (war2). The control group includes individuals who finished schooling
before the insurgency broke out, as well individuals living in less affected areas
during the first phase of the insurgency.
The average treatment effect is the variable war ∗ cohort. The insurgency
has a negative but not significant impact on years of schooling for women living
in urban areas of Kashmir (column 2). Given that the overall trend in J&K
is towards more education, a non significant treatment effect means, that these
women were left out from the development. If I change the control group to
Kashmiri women only, the effect remains not significant. Table 7 shows that
Muslim women have less education compared to Hindus. Women living in urban
areas have more education compared to women in rural areas. The cohort who
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went to school after 1990 has more education compared to women who finished
schooling before 1990.
The second part of table 7 shows the treatment effect for women living in
cities. I find a strong and negative effect on years of schooling. Women have up
to 3.54 years less schooling. If I reduce the control group to Kashmiri women
only, I find a similar negative effect on years of schooling.
[table 7 about here]
Table 8 shows the results for the male sample. The male sample is significantly
smaller than the female sample. My focus is on men who were of primary school
age during the first period of the insurgency. I expect boys of primary school
age to be less affected than girls. Girls are the first who have to stay home
when a conflict breaks out (Shemyakina 2011). Furthermore I do not expect a
negative effect of the insurgency on years of schooling for boys. In Kashmir only
the older male youth of secondary school age was harassed by security force or
targeted by militants to join them (Joshi 1999).
I find for boys living in urban areas no effect of the insurgency on years of
schooling (column 1 and 2). Boys living in cities have more years of schooling
than boys living in rural areas. Muslims have less years of schooling than Hindus.
Men who went to school after 1990 have more schooling than men who finished
their primary schooling before 1990. If I change the affected cohort to boys living
in cities, I find a positive but not significant treatment effect. The insurgency
did not alter the underlying positive trend towards more education.
[table 8 about here]
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 School completion
Children enrolled in schools during an armed conflict are likely to drop out
for safety reasons. The reduced supply of education makes it more difficult to
complete schooling as well. Dabla (2010) notes that 35 to 45 percent of the girls
and boys in schools dropped out in Kashmir during the Nineties which should
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result in strong negative effect6. I take women and men of primary school age (15
to 29 in 2005) and secondary school age (age 25 to 34 in 2005). The treatment
group went to school in urban areas of Kashmir during the Nineties.7 Without
the outbreak of the insurgency these individuals should have completed their
schooling. I use similar controls groups as before.
The dependent variable takes the value ’1’ if someone completed primary (or
secondary) schooling and zero otherwise. I use least square estimations because
the interpretation of the average treatment effect in a non-linear model is not
as straightforward.
I add controls for quality of education measured by student-teacher ratios
as well student-school ratios to my previous specifications. Data for the quality
of education are from the J&K Directorate of Statistics (2011) and available for
the pre-insurgency period as well for the school year 1990/91. I assign different
values for different age cohorts who went to school before 1990. For the affected
age-cohort I take the 1990/91 values for the entire first phase of the insurgency.
These ratios are higher compared to pre 1990 values.
Table 9 summarizes the results for women. There is a negative but not
significant average treatment effect for women. Being a Muslim reduces the
likelihood of completing primary education. Living in cities, as well belonging to
the age cohort 15 to 29, increases the probability to complete primary education.
I find a significant and negative impact of the insurgency on primary school
completion if I reduce the control group to Kashmiri women.
The results for secondary school completion differ. I find a positive but not
significant average treatment effect. The effect becomes significant after chang-
ing the control group to Kashmiri women only. A positive effect does not mean
that the insurgency made it more likely to complete secondary schooling. The
insurgency was not strong enough to stop girls from finishing their secondary
education.8 Given that those girls were older than girls in primary education,
they adapted differently to the violence. Women living in cities are more likely
to finish secondary schooling. Being a Muslim reduces the likelihood to com-
6He does not show any proof or how he came to this number. It is not surprising that I do
not find a strong effect in my models.
7I focus on urban areas only. Using cities only as the affected region would result in a very
small treatment group.
8Many women in Kashmir do not pursue secondary education at all. It is likely that women
who selected themselves into secondary education are different from women who did not.
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plete secondary education. Higher teacher as well student-school ratios reduce
the probability of finishing secondary schooling.
[table 9 about here]
Table 10 shows the results for the male sample. The sample is significantly
smaller than the female sample, especially for secondary education. For primary
education the models do not perform well in terms of significance. Although
the signs of the control variables are as expected, none of them are significantly
different from zero. Furthermore the majority of boys in primary school age
finished primary schooling, which does not generate enough variation in the
dependent variable.
I get significant results for completing secondary schooling. Young males of
secondary school age are more likely to complete their education. The treat-
ment effect is positive but not significant. If I narrow the control group to
Kashmiri only, I find a strong and positive treatment effect on secondary school
completion. The insurgency did not deter young men from finishing their sec-
ondary education. Higher school to student ratios have a negative impact on
the likelihood to complete secondary schooling.
[table 10 about here]
5.2 School enrollment
The demand for education can be affected by an armed conflict in various
ways. School buildings get destroyed or occupied, as well teachers can migrate.
Through the reduced supply of schooling the demand cannot be met. Further-
more the demand is reduced because parents decide to keep their children at
home for safety reasons.
I use schools per capita and teachers per capita to proxy for the supply of
education. I use altitude to proxy for the demand of education. Jammu and
Kashmir is a very mountainous area. Households living in higher areas have
less access to schooling, especially to secondary education (Raza, Ahmad and
Sheel 1990).
The demand for education is a binary variable and takes the value ’1’ if
somebody is enrolled in primary (or secondary) education and zero otherwise.
I present results for primary and secondary education in table 11 and 12. The
conflict affected age cohort for primary education is 15 to 29 in 2005 and for
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secondary 25 to 34 in 2005. Everyone older than this, should have completed
their education by 1990. I use urban areas of Kashmir as the more conflict
affected region. Focusing on cities only, would result in unreasonably small
treatment groups.
Table 11 summarizes the results for women in primary and secondary educa-
tion. There is a positive but not significant effect on primary school enrollment.
The underlying trend in J&K is that more girls and also boys enroll in primary
as well secondary education. A non significant treatment effect means that the
conflict is working against the underlying positive development. Altitude has a
negative impact on primary school enrollment. More teachers and schools per
capita have a positive effect on school enrollment, but only schools per capita
are significant.
For secondary education I find a negative impact on school enrollment. In
Kashmir most women have only primary education. It is not surprising, that if
an armed conflict breaks out, the demand for secondary education goes down.
More teachers and schools per capita have a positive impact on secondary school
enrollment. Girls living in cities enroll more into secondary education. Cities in
Kashmir offer more demanding and better paying jobs than villages or towns in
rural areas. Altitude has an unexpected positive effect on school enrollment. I
assume that women living in high altitude regions are willing to pursue higher
education due to the lack of work opportunities.
[table 11 about here]
Table 12 summarizes the results for the male sample. There is a negative
but not significant effect for boys enrolled in primary education. Given that
more boys are enrolling in primary education compared to women, a conflict
would affect them more. Muslim boys enroll less in primary education compared
to Hindus. Teachers and schools per capita have negative effects on school
enrollment. This is a troubling result but could have to do with different district
distributions I cannot account for. I use overall J&K numbers in my models.
Enrollment in secondary education is not affected negatively by the insur-
gency. I find a positive but not significant effect for men who were of school
age during the Nineties. Altitude has a positive effect for Kashmiri men. More
schools per capita have a positive effect on secondary school enrollment, as
expected.
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[table 12 about here]
5.3 Migration
Migration, or in the case of an armed conflict dislocation, can affect the results.
Individuals who left Kashmir, and got their schooling somewhere else safer, will
be in the sample if they returned to Kashmir. Similarly individuals who moved
recently from Jammu to Kashmir could be in the sample. Migration between
districts in Kashmir will not affect the results, as long women and men moved
from one urban area to another. Likewise moving from rural areas to urban
areas could affect the results.
I assumed that the current location was the location during the Nineties.
I do not know why people moved, but for how long they have been living at
their current residence 9. For women it is common to move to the husbands
household, but marriages are mostly local.
In the sample a majority of women or men lived for more than ten years at
their current residence. I perform robustness checks for women and men who
lived ten years and longer, as well 15 years and longer at their current residence.
Table 13 shows the results for years of schooling, school completion and
school enrollment. I report only the average treatment effects for school-aged
girls and boys living in urban areas of Kashmir. The treatment effects remain
qualitatively robust. For women I do have some changes in signs but not in
significance. I get the same signs and significances for the male sample. The
coefficients for primary and secondary school completion remain similar in sign
and significance for girls and boys. The same holds for enrollment in primary
and secondary schooling.
[table 13 about here]
5.4 Age cohort
I assumed that everyone in the age cohort 15 to 29 and living in urban Kashmir
is equally affected by the insurgency. It is more likely that girls and boys at
different stages in their education are affected differently. I test if children who
9The question in the NFHS survey refers to the local area not the house someone is living
in.
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just got into primary schooling are more vulnerable. I change the treatment
group to the age cohort 15 to 21.
Table 14 presents the results. I focus on children in urban areas only and do
not change the affected region to cities. The treatment group would reduce to
an unreasonable size in this case. I have similar signs and levels of significance
for years of schooling. The insurgency has a negative but not significant effect
on years of schooling for girls and boys.
The average treatment effect on primary school completion of girls is negative
and significant as before. The insurgency reduces the likelihood of completing
primary schooling. For the male sample I find a change in significance but the
insurgency has no effect on school completion for boys overall.
The insurgency has no negative effect on enrollment in primary education
for girls. The result remains similar compared to the age cohort 15 to 29. For
the male sample I find a different treatment effect. The insurgency reduces the
enrollment of boys in primary education. Given that enrollment rates are higher
for boys compared to girls, a negative effect is more likely for boys.
[table 14 about here]
5.5 Refining who lives in Kashmir
I assumed that women and men who speak Kashmiri live in Kashmir. Kashmiri
are identified by their language. The mass dislocation of Hindu Pandits makes it
also likely that only Kashmiri speaking individuals are left in the valley. I know
the location in the NHS-II (1998) sample and can confirm this hypothesis. But
Kashmiri is also spoken in the Doda, Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu
by some people.
To overcome possible biases I decide to use the information on primary
sampling units (PSU) and language. I assume that every PSU which has a
majority of Kashmiri speaking women and men is Kashmir. In the samples I
get a small change in composition. First I have some non-Kashmiri speaking
people in the sample for Kashmir, as well around 40 Kashmiri speaking for
Jammu. I do not expect the results to be affected significantly.
Table 15 summarizes the results for primary and secondary school outcomes.
I use urban Kashmir as the conflict affected region for the treatment group. The
effect on years of schooling remains qualitatively the same for women and men.
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The insurgency has no significant effect on years of schooling.
The treatment effect of the insurgency on primary and secondary school
completion for boys is the same. The male sample did not change in composition
and size. The female sample changed in composition. The change does not
affect the results. Kashmiri girls living in urban areas are less likely to complete
primary education.
The effect of the insurgency on enrollment in primary and secondary educa-
tion is similar compared to before. I get the same results for boys, because the
sample did not change in composition and size. The average treatment effects
on secondary school enrollment for girls remain similar. Girls are less likely to
enroll in secondary education.
To conclude the sample based on PSU and language spoken to identify Kash-
mir is very similar to the sample based on language spoken as the identifier.
[table 15 about here]
5.6 Conflict intensity
In my previous models I assigned a binary variable for women and men living in
conflict affected regions of J&K. I will utilize the dataset on violent incidents, I
created for the district level, to compute average numbers of victims for urban
areas of Kashmir. I assign this number to Kashmiri women and men living in
urban areas.
My strategy has two parts. First I will use this number to create the treat-
ment variable for the education models. In a second step I deal with endogeneity.
I assume that certain household characteristics like religion, being Kashmiri or
city size make it more likely to experience violence. In a first stage I regress the
violence variable on these characteristics and use predicted values in a second
stage regression to substitute for the treatment variable.
Table 16 summarizes the results. I focus on urban areas and primary edu-
cation of women and men in this section10. The average treatment effects for
years of schooling are similar compared to before. Conflict intensity or predicted
conflict intensity do not change the results significantly. The insurgency has no
effect on years of schooling. The overall trend in Kashmir is towards more years
10The results for the first stage regression are not presented, because the focus is on the
treatment effect in the second stage.
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of schooling. A not significant treatment effects means, that the insurgency is
working against the positive development in education, especially for women.
The treatment effects for completing primary schooling remain similar. The
signs and level of significances do not change. Girls living in urban areas of
Kashmir are less likely to complete primary education.
The results for enrollment in primary education are similar in sign and sig-
nificance as before. The insurgency has no significant effect. Given that the
trend in Jammu and Kashmir for girls is towards more enrollment in primary
education, the insurgency stopped those girls from enrolling. Boys in primary
school age are not affected by the insurgency if I use conflict intensity. There
is a change in significance in using predicted conflict intensity. The insurgency
has a negative impact on enrollment in primary schools.
[table 16 about here]
6 Conclusion
Armed conflicts differ in their historical and political background, actors in-
volved and outcomes. While insurgencies, like in Peru ended after the leader
of the movement got killed, or in the case of Nepal the movement won in over-
throwing the government, the Kashmir insurgency is still going on. It is not
even clear if it will end in the near future. India and Pakistan argue about
the territory while different militant groups perform violent acts on a daily ba-
sis. The civilian population has learned how to live with daily violence and the
presence of armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir after 22 years of insurgency.
I focus on the first phase of the insurgency which was from 1990 to 1996.
Boys and girls who were school-aged are negatively affected by the insurgency
in Kashmir. Girls in cities have up to 3.5 years less schooling. Primary school
completion is less for girls and boys in urban areas. School enrollment in primary
schools is less for both groups in urban areas of Kashmir. Secondary education is
not affected negatively for both groups. Given that the overall trend in Jammu
and Kashmir is more education at both stages, these groups are left out from
the underlying positive development.
After performing further robustness checks to account for migration, dif-
ferent age cohorts, location based on sampling units and language, as well a
continuous conflict measures, the results remain qualitatively similar.
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The findings have policy relevance. A difference and difference analysis can
identify groups more affected by the insurgency than others. Official Census
reports and summary reports based on the National Family Health Survey find
that compared to the 1981 Census and earlier rounds of the NFHS, education
for Jammu and Kashmir increased. First between the 1981 and 2001 Census
there is a difference of 20 years. The 1991 Census could not be carried out
in J&K for obvious reasons. Furthermore comparing different rounds of the
NFHS draws an incorrect picture because districts with violence were left out
for security reasons in 1993 and 1998.
I can identify groups based on language spoken as Kashmiri in the 2005
round of the NFHS and find that girls in urban areas of Kashmir, especially
cities, as well boys of primary school age were affected the most. These girls
and boys are adults in 2005 and will never be able to catch up on the education
lost. It should be in the interest of the J&K government to target these groups
especially women with literacy programs or employment programs.
Future work should revisit educational outcomes on the district level once
datasets become accessible. Districts in Kashmir differ in their violence expo-
sure. The NFHS-II offers district identifiers and includes the entire valley in the
survey which can be used to assess health outcomes for women and children.
Research on the adverse effects of conflict on health focused only on health out-
comes of children. The link between mother’s health and children’s health in
armed conflict situations has not been thoroughly researched yet to the best of
my knowledge.11
11Akresh and Verwimp (2006) use mother’s BMI to explain children’s height for age z-score,
but do not consider that the crop failure leading to a food crisis in Rwuanda also affects the
mother’s health.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Jammu and Kashmir district map
The districts most affected by violence are: Srinargar (40%), Baramula (17%), Kupwara (11%), Anantnag (10%),
Pulwama (7%) and Badgam (3%). The ranking is based on own calculations in using the event data set I created.
For the period 1990 to 2011 I have 1368 different events in total. 662 occured in the period 1990 to 1996 only.
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Figure 2: Number of victims for J&K - 1988 to 2011 - Source of raw data: SATP
(2011)
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C Tables
Women (n=3281) Men (n=1076)
Overall
Age 28.79 29.53
Years of Schooling 5.69 8.20
Age 15 to 29 6.96 (n=1862) 9.08 (n=579)
Age > 29 4.01 (n=1419) 7.18 (n=497)
No Schooling 40.29 % 15.80 %
Years lived at residence 12.61 10.61
Married 62.30 % 51.58 %
Household size 6.95 6.61
Children age < 5 0.67 n.a.
Hindu 33.92 % 36.43 %
Muslim 63.88 % 61.52 %
Sikh 1.77 % 1.77 %
Kashmiri language 54.53 % 49.72 %
Working 36.03 % 77.79 %
Urban (n=1081) Rural (n=2200) Urban (n=350) Rural (n=726)
Age 30.10 28.15 30.67 28.98
Years of Schooling 8.14 4.48 9.47 7.59
Age 15 to 29 9.43 (n=551) 5.93 (n=1311) 10.11 (n=173) 8.64 (n=406)
Age > 29 6.80 (n=530) 2.35 (n=889) 8.86 (n=158) 6.28 (n=281)
No Schooling 25.44 % 47.59% 10.86% 18.18%
Years lived at residences 11.78 12.99 10.72 10.40
Married 61.79% 62.55% 51.43% 51.56%
Household size 6.13 7.35 5.72 7.04
Children age < 5 0.45 0.79 n.a. n.a.
Hindu 35.25 % 33.27% 41.14% 34.16%
Muslim 60.50% 65.55% 54.29% 65.01%
Sikh 3.52% 0.91% 3.71% 0.83%
Kashmiri language 61.05% 51.32% 50.29% 49.45%
Working 28.49% 39.73% 78.00% 77.69%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics based on NHS-III for all Jammu and Kashmir
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Control Group Older cohort Younger Cohort
all urban / rural urban all urban rural
J&K Kashmir Kashmir J&K Jammu Kashmir
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Warcohort -.613 -.739 -.706 -.447 1.322 4.552***
(.926) ( .982) ( 1.238) (.584) (.801) ( 1.516)
Kashmiri .567* - - 1.410*** - -
(.328) (.337)
Muslim -3.187*** -2.512* -2.278 -3.854*** -4.449*** -3.157***
( .368) ( 1.385) (1.671) ( .333) (.845) (.976)
Capital 3.811*** - -3.869** 4.194*** - -.740
(.659) ( 1.77) ( .667) (1.554)
City 6.192*** 3.651** - 3.676*** -.750 -
(.519) ( 1.537) ( .451) (.748)
Town 2.352*** -1.521*** -5.390** 3.040*** -1.125** -2.049
(.575) (.403) (1.769) ( .466) (.512) (1.547)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1763 1123 660 1862 551 1010
R2 0.34 0.37 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.14
Table 3: Years of Schooling for Women in Urban Areas - Difference in Difference
Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for women in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to
29 in 2005 and lives in urban areas of Kashmir. The control group is 30 years and older or lives in less affected
regions of Jammu and Kashmir. I use a linear trend in all models.
Control Group Older cohort Younger Cohort
all urban / rural cities all cities rural
J&K Kashmir Kashmir J&K Jammu Kashmir
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Warcohort -.131 -.399 -1.167 .103 1.203 4.563***
(3.071) (3.116) ( 4.438) ( 1.220) ( 1.208) (1.475)
Kashmiri .489 - - 1.328*** - -
(.336) ( .332)
Muslim -3.088*** -2.550 -1.812* -3.847*** -2.971*** -3.207***
( .385) (1.928) ( .916) ( .339) (.800) (.953)
Capital 4.365*** 4.393*** - 3.792*** - -
( .504) (.510) ( .407)
City 6.099*** 9.463** - 3.603*** - -
( .535) ( 1.909) ( .458)
Town 2.598*** 2.585*** - 2.746*** - -
(.367) (.429) (.314)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1430 790 29 1862 139 677
R2 0.31 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.07 0.07
Table 4: Years of Schooling for Women in Cities - Difference in Difference
Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for women in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to
29 in 2005 and lives in cities of Kashmir. The control group is 30 years and older or lives in less affected regions of
Jammu and Kashmir. I use a linear trend in all models.
29
Control Group Older cohort Younger Cohort
all urban / rural urban all urban rural
J&K Kashmir Kashmir J&K Jammu Kashmir
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Warcohort 6.028* 4.897 5.172 4.453** 7.210*** .561
(3.451) ( 3.460) (3.589) (1.912) ( 1.560) ( .775)
Kashmiri -.000 - - .730 - -
(.791) (.596)
Muslim -1.525** -2.902 -2.875 -1.866** -4.827*** .217
(.749) ( 2.181) (2.225) (.785) ( 1.750) (3.494)
Capital 1.084 -1.640 2.847* -3.865** -3.324 -
( 1.223) ( 1.196) ( 1.641) ( 1.851) ( 2.129)
City 3.294*** -4.494** - .337 - .084
(.857) ( 1.957) (1.053) (2.826)
Town 2.361** - 4.514** -.394 -.243 3.973*
(.929) (2.000) (.850) (.837) ( 2.218)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 579 332 176 579 173 285
R2 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.07
Table 5: Years of Schooling for Men in Urban Areas - Difference in Difference
Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for men in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to 29
in 2005 and lives in urban areas of Kashmir. The control group is 30 years and older or lives in less affected
regions of Jammu and Kashmir. I use a linear trend in all models.
Control Group Older cohort Younger Cohort
all urban / rural cities all cities rural
J&K Kashmir Kashmir J&K Jammu Kashmir
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Warcohort 11.871** 8.368** -2.950 -2.391 1.961 .907
(2.502) (3.803) ( 5.561) ( 1.952) ( 1.909) (2.825)
Kashmiri .369 - - 1.694** - -
(.748) ( .660)
Muslim -1.700** -3.117 -9.686 -1.890** -6.252** -.566
(.741) ( 2.033) (4.038) (.812) (2.851) (3.502)
Capital 1.741* 1.962** - -.048 - -
( .887) (.911) (.792)
City 4.115*** -.537 - 1.236 - -
(.863) ( 2.060) ( 1.010)
Town 1.845*** 2.271** - 1.867 - -
( .657) ( .961) ( 1.198)
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 501 254 9 579 55 207
R2 0.10 0.06 0.87 0.04 0.19 0.04
Table 6: Years of Schooling for Men in Cities - Difference in Difference Regres-
sions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for men in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to 29
in 2005 and lives in cities of Kashmir. The control group is 30 years and older or lives in less affected regions of
Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. I use a linear trend in all models.
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All J&K Kashmir only All J&K Kashmir only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
War*Cohort -.037 -.39 War2*Cohort - 3.54*** -3.42**
(.429) (.462) (1.31) (1.31)
Kashmiri 1.07*** - Kashmiri .96 -
(.244) (.243)
Muslim -3.59*** - Muslim -3.50*** -
(.252) (.257)
Capital 3.95*** -5.80*** Capital 3.99*** 4.04***
(.518) (.757) (.321) (.323)
City 5.03*** - City 4.90*** 11.19***
(.352) (.359) (.741)
Town 2.63*** -7.31*** Town 2.66*** 2.54***
(.378) (.743) (.240) (.296)
Cohort 2.72*** 2.64*** Cohort 2.74*** 2.53***
(.369) (.521) (.366) (.518)
War (urban) .04 10.06*** War2 (city) 2.87*** -
(.499) (.714) (.843)
Constant yes yes Constant Yes Yes
Year fixed effects yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 3281 1789 N 3281 1789
R2 0.28 0.25 R2 0.28 0.25
Table 7: Years of Schooling for Women - Difference in Difference in Difference
Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for women in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to
29 in 2005 and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is 30 years and older or
lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. In model 2 and 4 I dropped
Muslim because 99 % of the Kashmiri are Muslims.
All J&K Kashmir only All J&K Kashmir only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
War*Cohort .41 -.70 War2*Cohort 1.60 1.04
(.765) (.861) (2.70) (3.32)
Kashmiri .60 - Kashmiri 1.02** -
(.450) (.449)
Muslim -1.51*** - Muslim -1.55*** -
(.435) (.442)
Capital -.361 - Capital .76 -
(.894) (.588)
City 2.45*** - City 2.97***
(.528) (.528)
Town .68 1.28* Town 1.39** 2.21***
(.541) (.724) (.398) (.552)
Cohort 1.33** 1.59* Cohort 1.35** 1.16
(.632) (.953) (.623) (.911)
War (urban) 1.15 1.52** War2 (city) -3.89* .07
(.908) (.767) (2.211) (2.45)
Constant yes yes Constant Yes Yes
Year fixed effects yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 1074 534 N 1074 534
R2 0.09 0.10 R2 0.09 0.09
Table 8: Years of Schooling for Men - Difference in Difference in Difference
Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for men in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to 29
in 2005 and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is 30 years and older or
lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. In model 2 and 4 I dropped
Muslim because 99 % of the Kashmiri are Muslims.
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Primary All J&K Kashmir only Secondary All J&K Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
War*Cohort -0.36 -.035 -.155*** War*Cohort -.022 .052 .149**
(.029) (.029) (.053) (.044) (.0442) (.064)
Kashmiri -.018 -.017 - Kashmiri .008 .069
(.027) (.027) (.043) (.055)
Muslim -.061*** -.061*** .001 Muslim .000 -.064 .010
(.023) (.023) (.063) (.037) (.046) (.064)
Capital .063*** 0.065*** -.003 Capital .032 0.187*** -.118
(.024) (.024) (.022) (.044) (.054) (.087)
City .063*** .063*** .055 City .126*** .153*** -
(.013) (.013) .062) (.029) (.032)
Town .064*** .066*** - Town .026 .136*** -.180***
(.014) (.014) (.029) (.040) (.088)
Cohort .089*** .044 .143** Cohort .277*** .212*** .147***
(.027) (.030) (.060) (.023) (.019) (.048)
War (urban) .048 .045 .211*** War (urban) .023 -.138** .089
(.032) (.032) (.053) (.053) (.055) (.092)
Teacher ratios .122 Teacher ratios -.169*** - -
(.075) (.003)
School ratios .176*** .234*** School ratios - -.005*** -.005***
(.057) (.093) (.0001) (.0001)
Constant yes yes yes Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 1929 1929 952 N 772 772 342
R2 0.05 0.05 0.07 R2 0.73 0.61 0.59
Table 9: School Completion primary and secondary for Women - Difference in
Difference in Difference Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for women in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to
29 in 2005 for primary education and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is
30 years and older or lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. The
treatment group for secondary education is in the age 25 to 34. The control group is 35 and older or lives in less
affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Primary All J&K Kashmir only Secondary All J&K Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
War*Cohort .055 .054 .045 War*Cohort .050 .087 .128**
(.052) (.052) (.061) (.064) (.066) (.071)
Kashmiri .012 .011 - Kashmiri .000 .029 -
(.027) (.028) (.044) (.051)
Muslim .005 .003 -.070 Muslim .005 .000 -.039
(.028) (.028) (.031) (.042) (.048) (.061)
Capital -.100 -.098 -.093 Capital -.037 -.003 -.095
(.058) (.057) (.057) (.078) (.076) (.089)
City .044 .042 - City .099*** .093** -
(.027) (.027) (.043) (.0452)
Town .020 .019 .020 Town -.030 .040 -.067
(.033) (.033) (.046) (.060) (.054) (.081)
Cohort -.018 -.042 -0.37 Cohort .234*** .154*** .090***
(.036) (.038) (.052) (.025) (.025) (.0408)
War (urban) -.024 -.024 -.018 War (urban) .054 .009 .091
(.055) (.055) (.066) (.081) (.068) (.080)
Teacher ratios .169 Teacher ratios 0.157*** - -
(.109) (.004)
School ratios .142 .181 School ratios - -.005*** -.005***
(.088) (.127) (.0001) (.0001)
Constant yes yes yes Constant Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 835 835 397 N 411 411 191
R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 R2 0.71 0.66 0.68
Table 10: School Completion primary and secondary for Men - Difference in
Difference in Difference Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for men in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to 29
in 2005 for primary education and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is 30
years and older or lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. The treatment
group for secondary education is in the age 25 to 34. The control group is 35 and older or lives in less affected
regions of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Primary All J&K Kashmir only Secondary All J&K Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
War*Cohort .027 .028 War*Cohort -.137*** -.121
(.057) (.060) (.051) (.093)
Kashmiri .008 - Kashmiri .019 -
(.026) (.054)
Muslim -.199*** -.374*** Muslim -.034 -.078**
(.031) (.234) (.047) (.034)
Capital -.007 -.403 Capital .104* 0.054
(.078) (.245) (.055) (.040)
City -.065 - City .168*** .129**
(.067) (.013) (.040) (.056)
Town -.039 -.444* Town .051 -
(.069) (.243) (.045)
Cohort .081 .048 Cohort .121 .106
(.054) (.068) (.074) (.130)
War (urban) .032 .424* War (urban) .183*** .222**
(.076) (.245) (.071) (.089)
Altitude -.086*** -.092 Altitude .033 .131***
(.032) (.056) (.063) (.038)
Teachers per capita .013 .013 Teacher ratios .688*** .656**
(.014) (.149) (.245) (.320)
Schools per capita .372*** .351*** School ratios .030*** .025***
(.124) (.017) (.003) (.004)
Constant yes yes Constant Yes Yes
Year fixed effects yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 1549 932 N 675 299
R2 0.06 0.03 R2 0.18 0.17
Table 11: School enrollment into primary and secondary education for Women
- Difference in Difference in Difference Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for women in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to
29 in 2005 for primary education and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is
30 years and older or lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. The
treatment group for secondary education is in the age 25 to 34. The control group is 35 and older or lives in less
affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Primary All J&K Kashmir only Secondary All J&K Kashmir only
Education Education
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
War*Cohort -.277*** -.189 War*Cohort .042 .112
(.051) (.228) (.087) (.099)
Kashmiri .008 - Kashmiri .032 -
(.054) (.051)
Muslim -.435*** .146 Muslim .038 -.100
(.047) (.201) (.051) (.103)
Capital -.014 .028 Capital .065
(.055) (.203) (.094)
City -.124 -.526*** City .151*** .162**
(.040) (.193) (.051) (.112)
Town -.067 - Town .054 -.045
(.045) (.056) (.089)
Cohort .026 .057 Cohort .021 -.039
(.074) (.262) (.081) (.117)
War (urban) .382** .322* War (urban) -.028 -.000
(.071) (.071) (.100) (.100)
Altitude -.086*** -.092 Altitude .033 .131***
(.032) (.056) (.063) (.038)
Teachers per capita -.687** .885*** Teacher ratios -.602*** -.526
(.245) (.347) (.252) (.411)
Schools per capita .181*** -.166 School ratios 1.65*** 1.53***
(.003) (.516) (.244) (.393)
Year fixed effects yes yes Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 253 140 N 354 160
R2 0.21 0.18 R2 0.20 0.18
Table 12: School enrollment into primary and secondary education for Men -
Difference in Difference in Difference Regressions
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors. Year
fixed effects includes years for men in school age during 1990 to 1996. The treatment group is in the age 15 to 29
in 2005 for primary education and lives in urban areas of Kashmir (War) or cities (War2). The control group is 30
years and older or lives in less affected regions of Jammu and Kashmir (all J&K) or Kashmir only. The treatment
group for secondary education is in the age 25 to 34. The control group is 35 and older or lives in less affected
regions of Jammu and Kashmir.
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Years of Schooling (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years .083 -.013 1.05 -.761
(.440) (.476) (1.36) (.877)
N 2779 1616 1007 521
R2 0.33 0.28 0.08 0.10
Living > 15 years .085 .055 1.14 -.796
(.450) (.486) (1.404) (.885)
N 2602 1545 995 521
R2 0.34 0.28 0.08 0.10
Years of Schooling (war2 = city )
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years -3.68*** -3.64*** 2.52 2.65
(1.163) (1.217) (2.894) (3.430)
N 2779 1616 1007 517
R2 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.09
Living > 15 years -3.03*** -2.74** -2.75 .621
(1.163) (1.155) (1.993) (3.570)
N 2602 1545 993 517
R2 0.34 0.28 0.10 0.10
Primary completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years -.042 -.144** .042 .048
(.033) (.057) (.053) (.060)
N 1611 855 785 387
R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06
Living > 15 years -.037 -.137** .043 .050
(.036) (.060) (.054) (.061)
N 1517 819 777 384
R2 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06
Secondary completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years .006 .112 .004 .030
(.050) (.070) (.069) (.077)
N 595 287 392 187
R2 0.63 0.57 0.67 0.69
Living > 15 years -.007 .113 -.001 .018
(.055) (.073) (.071) (.079)
N 526 263 385 185
R2 0.62 0.56 0.67 0.69
Primary Enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years .009 .008 -.310 -.193
(.062) (.066) (.231) (.225)
N 1330 846 231 137
R2 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.18
Living > 15 years .007 .008 -.310 -.193
(.065) (.068) (.231) (.225)
N 1240 806 231 137
R2 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.18
Secondary Enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Living > 10 years -.105* -.101 .031 .118
(.055) (.095) (.087) (.100)
N 529 259 338 158
R2 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18
Living > 15 years -.118** -.092 .033 .119
(.057) (.099) (.088) (.101)
N 459 238 334 157
R2 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.18
Table 13: Years living at current residence - Educational Outcomes for Women
and Men - Average Treatment Effects
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors.
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Years of Schooling (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Age 15 to 21 -.013 -.51 -.40 -1.36
(.459) (.510) (.808) (.890)
N 2368 1310 820 411
R2 0.31 0.29 0.10 0.11
Primary completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Age 15 to 21 -.047 -.180*** .092* .082
(.032) (.055) (.051) (.061)
N 1327 659 614 293
R2 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09
Primary enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Age 15 to 21 .083 .092 -.966*** -.780***
(.104) (.1056) (1.404) (.885)
N 2602 706 195 112
R2 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.24
Table 14: Affected age cohort 15 to 21 - Educational Outcomes for Women and
Men primary schooling only - Average Treatment Effects
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors.
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Years of Schooling (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Kashmir (PSU based) .149 -.172 .41 -.64
(.437) (.471) (.765) (.864)
N 3281 1789 1074 534
R2 0.28 0.25 0.09 0.10
Primary Completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Kashmir (PSU based) -.033 -.140*** .054 .045
(.030) (.051) (.052) (.061)
N 1929 952 835 397
R2 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07
Secondary Completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Kashmir (PSU based) .018 .040 .087 .128***
(.041) (.057) (.066) (.071)
N 895 403 411 191
R2 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.68
Primary Enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Kashmir (PSU based) .011 .028 -.277 -.189
(.055) (.060) (.229) (.228)
N 1549 932 253 140
R2 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.45
Secondary Enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Kashmir (PSU based) -.101* -.080 .042 .112
(.053) (.087) (.087) (.099)
N 675 299 354 160
R2 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.18
Table 15: Using PSU and language for identification - Educational Outcomes
for Women and Men - Average Treatment Effects
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors.
38
Years of Schooling (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Conflict Intensity -.035 -.380 .401 -.621
(.412) (.444) (.735) (.830)
N 3281 1789 1074 535
R2 0.28 0.25 0.09 0.10
Predicted Conflict Intensity .163 -.329 -.148 -1.18
(.465) (.587) (.842) (1.154)
N 3281 1789 1074 534
R2 0.28 0.25 0.09 0.10
Primary Completion (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Conflict Intensity -.034 -.149*** .052 .043
(.027) (.051) (.050) (.058)
N 1929 952 835 397
R2 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.07
Predicted Conflict Intensity -.046 -.189*** .092 .102
(.031) (.062) (.064) (.090)
N 1929 952 835 397
R2 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07
Primary Enrollment (war = urban)
Women Men
All J&K Kashmiri All J&K Kashmiri
Conflict Intensity .026 .027 -.266 -.182
(.055) (.058) (.220) (.219)
N 1549 932 253 140
R2 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.18
Predicted Conflict Intensity -003 .066 -.478** -.301
(.062) (.078) (.196) (.240)
N 1549 932 253 140
R2 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.18
Table 16: Conflict intensity and predicted conflict intensity - Educational Out-
comes for Women and Men primary schooling only - Average Treatment Effects
*** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. In all models I use robust standard errors.
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